the emotions of apes from eye contact, facial expression and gesture.4

Death: The mapping of the human genome has reversed the previously downward trend in animal experimentation in laboratories. For the foreseeable future non-human primates will play an ever-increasing role in biomedical research, in particular for research into infectious diseases and immune disorders and their treatments. In Europe an estimated 10,000 primates, genetically related to this affluent and ageing population, are required each year. The quality of animals needed for research means that wild-caught animals are increasingly replaced with captive-breed stock. Their similar physiology means the wild apes are often infected with pathogens harmful to humans. For this reason primates have been ruled out as source animals in the development of trans-species organ transplantation. The fear of spreading primate retroviruses means that transgenic pigs are most likely to be harvested for these organs. Great apes, however, retain their transitional role between human and non-human animals. Applications for human trials of xenotransplantation will be considered only when pig organs remain viable in primate recipients for periods over two months. Primate vivisection has emerged as a crucial arena for activists seeking to extend to non-human apes the same moral and legal protection as humans. In these spaces of the laboratory they claim that the human fear of death is driving us to sacrifice our sense of humanity.

Animals
William S. Lynn

Several years ago I was giving a talk on animals, ethics and social theory. In the middle of the talk, I asked my friend Beau to jump up on my desk and sit with me. He did so obligingly, gently meeting the gaze of my amused students. Referring to Beau, I asked: ‘What is this?’ My students provided a plethora of answers: canis familiaris; fur-ball; moral being; community resident. Each answer held its own truth and encapsulated humanity’s complicated relationship with animals.

The concept of ‘animal’ is ancient, developing out of readily observable differences between living and non-living nature, as well as animal and plant biology. The word has its roots in Latin, where animalis means animate, a characteristic associated with the possession of anima or soul. For the Greeks,
animals were living beings, or zoon. Thus Aristotle described humans as zoon politikon – political animals. Animals and plants were also the ‘two kingdoms’ by which medieval and modern taxonomists classified living nature. This schema has since been elaborated into five phyla, including Animalia (e.g., wolves) and Plantae (e.g., white pine), as well as other forms of life that are neither animal nor plant, that is Monera (e.g., bacteria), Protista (e.g., seaweed) and Fungi (e.g., moulds and mushrooms). As for human beings, we are simply another animal species, Homo sapiens sapiens, the ‘wise earthly ones’. Like all other creatures, we share in the drama and heritage of life, having evolved through a lineage of hominids and primates.

Yet in everyday life and language, we draw a sharp line between people and animals. An animal is a non-human, such as a mammal, reptile, amphibian, fish or octopus, the rest of the living world being divided into insects, bugs, germs, plants, slime and stuff. If humans are but one species of animal, why do we stress our differences from other beings? There is no simple answer, but we can make a start by noting one indispensable element – our moral sensibilities about the animal world.

An animal is not simply a description of something in nature; it is a culture-laden concept that incorporates ethical sensibilities. These sensibilities are readily identified in classifications that separate the moral standing of humans from the rest of nature. Especially noteworthy are mythic stories that posit a special role or value for humankind. Sometimes these stories are religious, such as the supernatural acts related in Genesis. As the favoured creatures of God, Adam and Eve are born through a special act of creation and given dominion over the (other) animals of the earth. Sometimes these stories are secular, such as the ‘social construction of nature’ thesis so popular in social theory. Here, humans are mysteriously decoupled from the natural world, as if persons and societies were disembodied spirits governed by intentions and social forces alone. The natural world thereby becomes the ‘external body’ of humankind, ‘resources’ for economic activity, or a ‘social nature’ produced by political-economic processes. The belief that nature is made for or by one particularly clever species is breathtaking, if self-absorbed.

Despite clear differences in content and application, these myths share an anthropocentric prejudice against the natural world. This prejudice is rooted in the belief that only humans have moral standing and significance. Were the lines of anthropocentric privilege drawn strictly, we could simply refer to speciesism – the uncritical privileging of humans over all other animals. This is not the case. Anthropocentrism creates a scala naturae (‘chain of being’; natural hierarchy) that, in addition to species, invokes race, class, gender and ethnicity as criteria of discrimination. This makes the conceptual and practical resonance between anthropocentrism and other oppressions too blatant to
ignore. Both racism and sexism (to name but two) involve an explicit process of bestialization – construing a person or group as less than fully human. To the anthropocentric eye, some people and all animals are Other – creatures different from one’s individual or collective identity, creatures with whom we cannot identify or empathize, creatures we are excused from caring about. Examples of the process of bestialization abound. To justify the horrors of the Holocaust, the Nazis claimed that Jews, Gypsies and gays were subhuman. To justify the marginalization of women from public life, Aristotle claimed that women lacked the virtue of reason and were thereby imperfect men. The First Peoples of North America were likened to wolves, thence slaughtered like their fellow creatures to make way for more worthy Europeans. These insights should have profound implications for social theory in geography and beyond. Racism, classism, sexism and ethnocentrism are human-focused brands of anthropocentrism, part of a broader practice of othering. This destabilizes the ethical theories we routinely use to justify a concern for human well-being, while peripheralizing concerns for the well-being of animals. It also points toward new possibilities of solidarity between those struggling for a vision of justice that embraces the natural world.

What can be said, then, about the state of animals in the new millennium? Both human and non-human animals are co-residents in a diversity of landscapes. These landscapes were created through a combination of natural and social forces (e.g., evolutionary-ecology and human agency). This combination generates the selection pressures that privilege the existence or flourishing of some animals (including humans) over others. Environmentalists tend to be more comfortable with the pressures of natural selection. Devoid of human caprice, natural selection is presumed to be 'wise' in the sense that it promotes fitness and biodiversity. Yet over the last millennia, social forces became the prime source of selection pressure. Social constructionists are at ease with this shift. This is primarily because, in their own eyes, there is nothing in the world except humans that is worth caring about. To be fair, there are pressing issues of injustice and need within the human community. This well-meaning concern for the human world is perhaps the root source of the social construction's antipathy towards the 'rights' of animals and nature. Even so, the state of the world is such that unless animals serve an instrumental human purpose, their existence (much less well-being) ranges from uncertain to dire. This needs to change.

We cannot eliminate humanity’s geographic agency – our ability to affect the living earth for good or ill. We can, however, take moral responsibility for our impact on the animal world. Across the globe, human activity generates animal suffering, species extinction, ecosystem dysfunction and social crisis. How then should we respond? Justice is one (of several) correct answers. As the dominant species on earth, humans have yet to find a way of life that secures a just world for people, animals and the rest of nature. One reason for this failure is a narrow sense of procedural justice that marginalizes the moral claims of disempowered beings, human and non-human. To counteract this marginalization, we need a richer understanding of justice, one that embraces the animal world. A trans-species justice should unmask the ideological connections and material manifestations that oppress others based on their race, class, gender, ethnicity or species. It should envision a world where animals are valued as individuals as well as functional units in ecosystems. It should regard ‘the environment’ as habitat for human and non-humans,
and assess whether the humanitat (the built and social environment) empowers equal, free and diverse individuals and societies. A trans-species justice should seek nothing less that the creation of just landscapes - spaces where people and animals, domestic or wild, companion or carnivore, may flourish as respected co-residents on a shared planet.

Shadows
Stephen Cairns

The ‘radiant city’ is a dazzling image in rhetoric on urban form. So much so that the association of cities with light is often naturalized in the Western imagination. In fact, this association was explicitly made quite recently, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and even then in an unexpected way through an obsession about darkness. This association coincided with a broader societal confrontation with a perceived psychological and physical menace. This menace took the form of populations deemed to be aberrant – the mad, the diseased, the criminal – and was understood to be incubated by darkness, and so came to be represented by darkness. As Foucault put it, ‘[a] fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of darkened spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men and truths’. This fear generated an obsession for ‘the regulation of phenomena of population, controlling their fluctuations and compensating their irregularities’. As a consequence, an almost fetishistic concern for light emerged ‘to break up the patches of darkness’ and to ‘eliminate the shadowy areas of society’. Light became a crucial component in the management of this fluctuating menace, and it began to appear at the heart of new immobilizing technologies of power. The most famous of these was Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.

But any exploration of more recent manifestations of this (not so) old story quickly shows that this tension between light and darkness has not remained so fixed in its relation to architecture and urbanism as the example of the Panopticon suggests. Indeed, what Foucault goes on to say is that the tendency to give importance to the gaze in Bentham’s thought was already ‘archaic’ in his own time; the ‘spatializing, observing, immobilizing’ technologies of power were already ‘being transcended by other and much more subtle mechanisms’. These relied less on materially demarcated space, and invested in another space altogether: head space. As the workings of power are interiorized so a psychical dimension is added to the city-light story. The trope of darkness follows along in this transposition, but now untethered from the material spaces of the city, it operates in an altogether more fluid and imagistic way.

One such update to the city-light story is found in Val Lewton’s and Jacques Tourneur’s extraordinarily horror classic The Cat People (1942, rko Radio Pictures). The film is set in Chicago and concerns the life and loves of a recent Serbian immigrant, Irena. What gives this film its horror cachet is that, along with the baggage of immigrant optimism and energy, Irena brings to the new world a particular personal burden: ‘the spectre of a Satanic medieval curse’ that dooms her ‘to exist as a murderous, shape-shifting creature of darkness’ (as the video jacket has it). Irena’s burden, as it transpires, is her belief that she transforms into a deadly panther whenever she is sexually aroused and jealous.

The key scene comes late in the film – the point where the protagonists, and we in the audience, first come to realize the deadly seriousness of what had seemed to be nothing...
Further Reading
Gaskell, S. M., ed., Slums (Leicester, 1990)
Mayne, A., The Imagined Slum (Leicester, 1993)

chris otter: ‘Streets’

steve pile: ‘Cities’

andrew barry: ‘Organics’

lisa law: ‘Food’

mike pearson: ‘Horses’

references